Overview

In the first six months of 2019, just over 20,200 refugees were submitted by UNHCR for resettlement to 18 countries in Europe. This is almost two-thirds of the total submission in 2018, and already more than double the average rate of 17,800 submissions per year during the previous 10 years. Three countries that received smaller numbers of resettlement submissions in 2018 have not yet received submissions during 2019.

Europe’s proportion of resettlement submissions globally in 20194 is 48%. Between 2009 and 2016, this proportion increased from 10% to 18%, before substantially increasing to 52% during 2017 and 40% during 2018. The increase in 2017 is primarily due to a significant decrease globally in the scale of some States’ resettlement programmes, most notably by the United States of America, but also to an increase of resettlement places made available by European States.

EU talks in Malta and a more lenient policy of the new Italian government stirs hope for an end to Stand-offs for civilian rescue ships. Amid further rescues by national authorities, no EU-led Search and Rescue (SAR) operation is in sight. With the extension of the mandate for Operation Sophia training of the so-called Libyan coastguard continues.

The NGO Alarm Phone reports that, on Thursday, 40 people were rescued in Italian waters and brought to the island of Lampedusa after the NGO had alerted the authorities of a boat in distress.

The same day, Spanish sea rescue authorities reportedly rescued a boat carrying 37 people off the Spanish island of Gran Canaria. They had been on the Mediterranean for three days trying to reach Europe. Earlier this week, Spanish authorities rescued 115 people from two boats in distress in the Alborán Sea and in the Strait of Gibraltar and disembarked them in the Andalusian port cities Motril and Cádiz. On Tuesday, a British cruise ship picked up 20 people from overcrowded inflatable boats on its way from Cadiz to Barcelona and disembarked them in the port of Almeria.

According to the Armed Forces Malta (AFM), 265 people disembarked in Malta early on Saturday. 229 migrants from Saturday’s arrivals were rescued directly by the AFM from three boats in distress in Maltese water. Another 36 were transferred to an AFM patrol boat from the civilian rescue vessel Ocean Viking.

The 182 people remaining on the Ocean Viking were granted permission to disembark in the Italian port of Messina on Tuesday. They had been rescued by the ship jointly operated by the NGOs SOS MEDITERANEE and Doctors without Borders (MSF) at the Mediterranean in the course of last week. France and Germany agreed to take 50 people from the ship, Portugal 20, and Ireland and Luxembourg two each. The Italian Catholic church agreed to accommodate the remaining 58 people, without support from the Italian state.

On Thursday the Council of the EU officially extended the mandate of EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia by six months, until 31 March 2020. Naval ships remain suspended with reference to on-going negotiations on disembarkation procedures. However, an EU-led SAR operation has not been part of the negotiations on disembarkation and relocation arrangements in Malta this week. Although the core mandate of operation Sophia is to “disrupt the business model of migrant smugglers and human traffickers in the Southern Central Mediterranean”, the operation had saved around 50 000 lives of people trying to reach Europe. Part of the mandate is also continued training of the so-called Libyan Coastguard that has been implicated in numerous incidents of abuse and human rights violations of people they intercepted at sea, including the death of a person upon disembarkation last week.

For further Information:

• ECRE, Mediterranean: Over 400 Rescued while Deaths Continue, September 2019, September 2019

• ECRE, Stand-offs Continue at the Mediterranean Despite New Government in Italy, September 2019

• ECRE, MED: Silver Lining Looms on the Horizon while NGOs Endure Salvini’s ‘Final Blow’, September 2019

• ECRE, Deaths and Standoffs on the Med Reinforce Calls for State-led SAR, August 2019

• ECRE, Mediterranean: Deaths, Rescues and Political Manoeuvres Continue, June 2019

• ECRE, UN Agencies Raise Alarm over Libya on Land and Sea, June 2019

• ECRE, Interception and Return of 170 Refugees to Libya, May 2019

• ECRE, From Bad to Worse for Migrants Trapped in Detention in Libya, May 2019

• ECRE, Last Breath of Operation Sophia Should Push Coalition of the Willing, March 2019

• ECRE, A Contingency Plan for Disembarkation and Relocation, January 2019

In the last few weeks, some progress has been made on the temporary arrangements for disembarkation and relocation in the Mediterranean, first at a special meeting in Valletta and at the Justice and Home Affairs Council in Luxembourg on Tuesday. ECRE offers a cautious welcome to these developments: welcome because there are more positive than negative elements but cautious because undesirable points still find their way in. The agreement now needs to be finalised and expanded.

The Coalition and the Agreement

First, it should be emphasised that this is not an agreement in any formal sense. As the French Interior Minister explained after the JHA Council, this is not an international treaty that countries sign up to. We are way into the territory of political and practical cooperation and away from legal solutions – although a wide range of international law provisions still apply as is sometimes overlooked.

In terms of what is actually in place it is best to separate two elements: the coalition of the willing and the agreement. There is a group of European countries who are working together to manage the humanitarian consequences of the situation in the Mediterranean. By ECRE’s count, this now includes 17 countries. The coalition has fuzzy edges – a few countries have come in and out, such as Austria, invited to some meetings when it held the EU Presidency but even then present in person but not in spirit (an unwilling participant in the coalition of the willing and not one of the 17). In July, France referred to 14 countries in the preliminary agreement; on Tuesday they referred to 10 EU Member States who welcomed the Valletta developments.

The agreement is not the same as the coalition. Following the Malta meeting, it was announced that four countries had reached an agreement: France, Germany, Italy and Malta. This was the formal sign that Italy and Malta had joined the arrangement – their absence was a gaping hole at the July meeting but the change in the composition of the Italian government has enabled their involvement.

The agreement can be seen as encompassing these four countries which have signed up and also those who have demonstrated through their actions that they agree to the arrangements. The best indicator of being part of the agreement is involvement in relocation. To date there are 12 countries who have relocated people at some point in the last 18 months: Croatia, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, and Spain. Then, Finland which has just started relocation following the appointment of a Green Minister of the Interior who changed their policy, and Belgium which has relocated people but is not currently involved as it doesn’t have a government. It would be unfortunate and unlikely if its new government withdrew definitively from collective efforts to manage a European challenge.

With Italy and Malta, that makes a core group of 15 operating the informal agreement out of a coalition of up to 17. Switzerland and Sweden have been in discussions but have not relocated people, so are best described as part of the coalition but not the agreement.

What has been agreed?

The content of the agreement is slightly clearer than its membership. Following the argument above, what has been agreed is the Malta Declaration but it is also the practical arrangements that are operating, as countries that are relocating have agreed to be part of something. Thus, as well as the text of the Malta Declaration, we also assess information on the informal arrangements that are apparently working.

On the positive side, there is now an agreement on relocation including some sort of quota system for relocation of rescued people. This is already being applied and features in the Malta Declaration (point 2).

The agreement on who to relocate is also positive, with a reference to asylum-seekers (point 2). A major sticking point has been some countries’ unwillingness to relocate those who – after brief nationality-based speculation – are presumed not to have protection needs. For political reasons, some may hang on to the idea that it only applies to the most manifestly founded but that is not what is stated or what is happening in practice.

The process set out tends towards the positive with a reference to Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), (point 4) which probably means the “Messina Model” developed by EASO for managing relocation. Having a SOP – and the involvement of EASO – is likely to reduce the risk of unlawful detention and denial of access to the asylum procedure which has followed some (reluctant) disembarkations. There are good references to fast relocation and to a four-week time limit.

On return, there is good and bad. Point 7 argues for return: …of those not “eligible for international protection”. This is presumably after the fast-track relocation and status determination, or for those not seeking asylum, so it may not imply changes in practice or procedure. As is de rigeur in any document on asylum and migration, there is a disproportionate emphasis on return. So long as that is not translated into new procedures, as per the hotspots, or yet more (un-spendable) resources, then it can be ignored.

Further difficulties in the agreement can be remedied either by adding or removing elements. First, it should cover all countries in the Mediterranean not just Italy. While the previous Italian government was in place, Member States supported wanted it to cover more countries so that it could not be presented as a victory for Salvini. Now, the scope seems to have narrowed again to only Italy. Partly in response, Bulgaria, Cyprus and Greece presented their own plan to the JHA Council. The actions suggested are not wholly clear nor adequate however the initiative is best seen as a call for help and a reminder that support should also apply to them, and rightly so. It follows previous proposals from Cyprus for relocation given increasing arrivals there.

Second, the declaration says that state-owned vessels should disembark in the flag state (point 1). This was not in the earlier drafts; it was presumably added as a condition for Italy and Malta to sign up. It is probably a dig at Germany. Tension has arisen in relation to major SAR NGOs registered in Germany or with prominent German staff members. Although the reference is to “state-owned” vessels, it echoes the Salvinian rhetorical approach of saying “Why don’t you take the ship?” when other governments urged Italy to allow vessels to dock.

Whatever the explanation, the suggestion is idiotic and contravenes numerous aspects of international law, and not least the Law of the Sea. As ECRE has previously discussed, there are different interpretations of the rules on the port of disembarkation, and not least key differences between Italy and Malta, which is one of the underlying reasons for the crisis. However, the rules could not possibly be stretched so far as to say that disembarkation should be in the flag state. For example, if Ireland sends ships to the region as it has done in the past, are they supposed to then disembark in Dublin port?

Other negative elements include the reference to the use of leverage on Countries of Origin in the context of return (point 7); the instructions to SAR providers to comply with commands from Regional Coordination Centers (which could include Libya) and not to “obstruct” coastguards including the Libyan Coast Guard (point 9); and a call on UNHCR/IOM to “encourage” support for disembarkation in North Africa (point 14).

These points should not be there but insofar as they call for actions from organisations and governments who are not be party to the agreement they are immaterial, if unwelcome.

Beyond the outright negative elements, there are weaknesses. There is no agreement on dividing responsibility for disembarkation – i.e. where should ships dock. The draft agreement included different options, including an “automatic rotation scheme”. Apparently this could not be agreed. ECRE has argued that two pieces are essential: as well as a relocation mechanism, there needs to be an agreement to divide responsibility for disembarkation without prejudice to the existing provisions of the Law of the Sea. Discussions should continue on this.

The Declaration calls for an increase in EU aerial surveillance but there is no reference to reinstatement of maritime operations. The Declaration and any related agreement has no status in the Member State deliberations on the future mandate of Operation Sophia or of Frontex operations, which take place in their own respective structures. However, it should be read as an indication that despite the end (or break from) Salvini, there is no plan to reinstate maritime operations. This would be a major error, and not just due to the humanitarian consequences. ECRE has commented on the problems of removing Operation Sophia’s naval assets (which had rescued +45,000 people just by being present). The related crackdown on SAR NGOs is not working – they continue to operate. (And not only: the Protestant church in Germany has just bought a rescue ship to operate in the Mediterranean.) But these efforts should not have to substitute for state/EU-operated SAR in the most deadly sea area in the world. In addition, without adequate SAR efforts merchant ships have to rescue people and this causes disruption to shipping.

Welcoming, Cautiously

Overall, this is important progress, and a cautious welcome is fair. Of course, the coalition of the willing model is far from ideal, but it is better than nothing. Those who object because it apparently undermines solidarity in the EU – cue spurious reference to Article 80 TFEU – should get their priorities straight. This is a humanitarian issue not an attempt to undermine the workings of the EU.

The numbers are adding up, with the coalition discussions bringing in more countries. As well as the four who have formally joined the agreement, another 10 have demonstrated that they are part of it through their actions, and specifically involvement in relocation. The countries outspokenly opposed to the agreement – Hungary and Denmark of course – look more and more isolated. Their tired and unfounded arguments about pull factors are even being challenged by the media.

As with the relocation programme, there is a risk that well-meaning people condemn any positive measure for not being enough. It’s not enough – obviously – but that doesn’t mean it’s without value. To say so, plays into the hands of those who would rather do nothing and give up on any kind of collective and halfway decent policy. Similarly, the criticism that this tentative agreement is not a “solution” misses the point – there is no such thing. Asylum and migration are complex policy issues which need to be tackled piece by piece. The overdue emergence of an agreement to deal with one particular humanitarian mess is but one necessary measure. The long-term flaws that provoked the situation remain to be tackled, and there will be no shortage of other short-term challenges to manage.

Editorial: Catherine Woollard, Secretary General for the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE)

The ‘Messina model’ can be understood as the practical modus operandi that was developed, applied and tested in Messina, Sicily during the Seawatch 3 disembarkation / voluntary relocation in March 2019.

This model has subsequently been applied in several other disembarkations / voluntary relocations in / from Malta and Italy and has proved to be a robust but flexible mechanism. Three of these operations are still on-going (Ocean Viking in Malta and Open Arms and Eleanor in Italy).

Under this model, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) deploys an Asylum Support Team or teams to the requesting authority upon the Commissions’ request and provides the following support:

• Information Provision access to procedure and on relocation.

• Development and subsequent application of relocation matching criteria. The cascaded criteria applied include: i) application of the Dublin criteria and urgent vulnerable cases; ii) family links iii) cultural links; iv) subsequent fair and proportional allocation system among participating Member States.

• Pre selection interviews with cultural mediation and preparation of proposed matching list for Commission for distribution to Member States.

• Support for Member State selection missions – logistics, coordination and cultural mediation, support for cultural orientation sessions and general back office support.

• Conducting of selection missions on behalf of certain Member States.

• Support for remote selection missions where requested (virtual connection and remote interpretation).

• Support for registration of applicants in Eurodac & host MS databases (e.g. Vestanet in Italy).

• Support for coordination between Member States.

• Support for UAMs and other vulnerable groups where requested in terms of vulnerability assessments and social work support.

• Support for the respective Dublin Units in terms of take charge support, travel documentation support, relocation notifications and related information provision for relocation applicants.

The Messina model requires and foresees that the legal basis of the intervention should be article 17 of the Dublin Regulation.

It should be noted that the vast majority of persons do apply for international protection, which renders them eligible for relocation and triggers the applicability of article 17 of the Dublin Regulation. However, the assessment of the need for international protection takes place after relocation in the Member State of relocation and this is therefore not part of the process that EASO is involved in.

General Assembly
Official Records
Seventy-fourth Session
Supplement No. 12

I. Introduction

1. Displacement levels remained high during the reporting period, with UNHCR facing significant challenges in its efforts to protect and assist people of concern to the organization.
   Nonetheless, there were also reasons for optimism, in particular when States and other stakeholders agreed on the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) as a new framework for predictable and equitable responsibility-sharing, the result of two years of extensive consultations led by UNHCR. The GCR was affirmed by the General Assembly in December 2018.1 2. By the end of 2018, some 70.8 million2 people had been forced from their homes as a result of persecution, conflict and violence; including 25.9 million refugees3 and 41.3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs).4 An estimated 13.6 million people were newly displaced, including 10.8 million within the borders of their own country. This meant that some 37,000 people were forced to flee their homes every day. Millions of people around the world continued to be at risk of statelessness, often encountering obstacles in accessing basic rights such as education, healthcare, employment and freedom of movement.

2. During the year, UNHCR and partners found themselves in a race against time to improve conditions for hundreds of thousands of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, ahead of the monsoon season. More people were uprooted by recurrent conflict in the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The security and human rights situation significantly deteriorated in Burkina Faso and Cameroon, leading to substantial displacement, in particular internally. Millions were exposed to hunger as the crisis in Yemen deepened. The conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic entered its ninth year, keeping millions of people in displacement. A massive outflow from Venezuela (the Bolivarian Republic of) affected the entire region, and complex movements of refugees and migrants presented further challenges in Central America, the Mediterranean and elsewhere. At the same time, there was increasing pressure on displaced people to return to unstable situations, families were separated, borders were closed, boats were turned away and lives continued to be lost at sea.

3. In many regions, divisive and politicized discourse about refugees and migrants contributed to growing protection risks. Nonetheless, and despite the significant social and economic challenges faced by major host countries, governments and communities continued to demonstrate solidarity and generosity, upholding the principles of international refugee protection. Around 84 per cent of refugees were hosted by countries in developing regions.

4. During 2018, around 2.9 million people returned to their areas or countries of origin, including some 2.3 million IDPs and 594,000 refugees. While an estimated 1.4 million refugees were in need of resettlement, only some 81,300 places were available.

Addis Ababa , October 25/2019 The Government of Ireland has extended 10 million Euros to Ethiopia today to enhance and improve vulnerable and food insecure households livelihood.

Finance State Minister Admasu Nebebe and Patrick McManus, Cooperation Head of Ireland Government, signed the agreement.

The objective of today’s agreement is to enhance and improve vulnerable and food insecure households livelihood, resilience to shocks, food security and nutrition, according to a press release of the Ministry of Finance.

During the signing ceremony, Finance State Minister Admasu said the agreement will contribute toward improving rural safety net nutrition service to food insecure households.

Cooperation Head of Ireland Government, Patrick McManus said on his part the Irish government is committed to continue supporting the effort to tackle food insecurity.

The Government of Ireland will also support the homegrown economic reform, he added.

The Government of Ethiopia began implementing the Productive Safety Net Program developed in 2004 in most chronically food insecure woredas of Amhara, Tigray, Oromia, and Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples regions.

Assemblée générale
Documents officiels
Soixante-quatorzième session
Supplément no 12

I. Introduction

1. Le Haut-Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés (HCR) a eu beaucoup de difficultés à protéger et à aider les personnes relevant de sa compétence, les déplacements n’ayant pas perdu de leur ampleur au cours de la période considérée. Il a toutefois eu quelques raisons d’être optimiste, en particulier lorsque les États et les autres parties prenantes ont adopté le Pacte mondial sur les réfugiés en tant que nouveau cadre de partage prévisible et équitable des responsabilités. Fruit de deux années de consultations approfondies menées par le HCR, le Pacte a été approuvé par l’Assemblée générale en décembre 2018.

2. À la fin de l’année 2018, les persécutions, les conflits et la violence avaient forcé quelque 70,8 millions de personnes, dont 25,9 millions de réfugiés et 41,3 millions de personnes déplacées dans leur propre pays4 (déplacés), à quitter leur foyer. On comptait environ 13,6 millions de personnes nouvellement déplacées, dont 10,8 millions à l’intérieur de leur propre pays, ce qui signifiait que chaque jour, quelque 37 000 personnes étaient contraintes de partir de chez elles. Des millions de personnes dans le monde courraient toujours le risque de devenir apatride et des obstacles les empêchaient souvent de jouir de certains de leurs droits fondamentaux tels que l’éducation, la santé, l’emploi et la liberté de circulation.

3. Au cours de l’année écoulée, le HCR et ses partenaires ont dû se battre contre la montre pour améliorer les conditions de vie de centaines de milliers de réfugiés rohingya au Bangladesh avant la saison de la mousson. Les conflits récurrents en République centrafricaine et en République démocratique du Congo ont poussé davantage de personnes à quitter leur foyer. La situation sur le plan de la sécurité et des droits de l’homme s’est considérablement détériorée au Burkina Faso et au Cameroun, ce qui a entraîné des déplacements importants, en particulier à l’intérieur de ces deux pays. Au Yémen, des millions de personnes ont souffert de la faim alors que la crise s’aggravait. Entré dans sa neuvième année, le conflit en République arabe syrienne continuait d’empêcher des millions de déplacés de revenir chez eux. L’exode massif en provenance du Venezuela (République bolivarienne du) a eu des répercussions sur l’ensemble de la région, et les mouvements complexes de réfugiés et de migrants ont donné lieu à des difficultés supplémentaires en Amérique centrale, en Méditerranée et ailleurs. Dans le même temps, des pressions de plus en plus fortes ont été exercées sur les personnes déplacées pour qu’elles retournent dans des zones instables, des familles ont été séparées, des frontières ont été fermées, des bateaux ont été refoulés et d’autres personnes ont perdu la vie en mer.

4. Dans de nombreuses régions, des discours clivants et politisés sur les réfugiés et les migrants ont contribué à accroître les risques en matière de protection. Toutefois, malgré les graves difficultés économiques et sociales qu’éprouvent les principaux pays d’accueil, les gouvernements et populations locales ont continué de faire preuve de solidarité et de générosité en appliquant les principes de la protection internationale des réfugiés. Environ 84 % des réfugiés étaient accueillis par des pays situés dans des régions en développement.

5. En 2018, 2,9 millions de personnes environ sont retournées dans leur région ou leur pays d’origine, dont quelque 2,3 millions de déplacés et 594 000 réfugiés. Alors même qu’environ 1,4 million de réfugiés avaient besoin d’être réinstallés, seules quelque 81 300 places étaient disponibles.

Asamblea General
Documentos Oficiales
Septuagésimo cuarto período de sesiones
Suplemento núm. 12 (A/74/12)

I. Introducción

1. Las cifras de desplazamiento siguieron siendo elevadas durante el período que abarca el presente informe y la Oficina del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados (ACNUR) se enfrentó a importantes retos considerables en su labor de protección y asistencia de las personas de interés para la organización. No obstante, también hubo motivos para el optimismo, en particular cuando los Estados y otras partes interesadas convinieron en adoptar el pacto mundial sobre los refugiados como nuevo marco para una distribución previsible y equitativa de la responsabilidad, el resultado de dos años de amplias consultas dirigidas por el ACNUR. El pacto mundial sobre los refugiados fue afirmado por la Asamblea General en diciembre de 2018.

2. A finales de 2018, unos 70,8 millones de personas se habían visto obligadas a dejar sus hogares como consecuencia de la persecución, los conflictos y la violencia; de esas personas 25,9 millones eran refugiados y 41,3 millones eran desplazados internos. Se estimaba que había 13,6 millones de nuevos desplazados, de los cuales 10,8 millones lo habían sido dentro de las fronteras de su propio país. Ello significaba que unas 37.000 personas se veían obligadas a abandonar sus hogares cada día. Millones de personas en todo el mundo seguían expuestas al riesgo de apatridia y con frecuencia tropezaban con obstáculos para acceder a derechos básicos como la educación, la atención de la salud, el empleo y la libertad de circulación.

3. Durante el año, el ACNUR y sus asociados se vieron inmersos en una carrera contrarreloj para mejorar las condiciones de cientos de miles de refugiados rohinyás en Bangladesh antes del inicio de la temporada de monzones. En la República Centroafricana y la República Democrática del Congo más personas se vieron desplazadas por el conflicto recurrente. La situación de seguridad y derechos humanos se deterioró considerablemente en Burkina Faso y el Camerún, lo que causó un número elevado de desplazamientos, en particular a nivel interno. Millones de personas se vieron expuestas al hambre debido al recrudecimiento de la crisis en el Yemen. El conflicto en la República Árabe Siria, que entró en su noveno año, siguió provocando el desplazamiento de millones de personas. La salida masiva de nacionales de Venezuela (República Bolivariana de) afectó a toda la región y los movimientos complejos de refugiados y migrantes plantearon nuevas dificultades en Centroamérica, el Mediterráneo y otros lugares. Al mismo tiempo, se ejerció una presión cada vez mayor sobre las personas desplazadas para que regresaran a situaciones inestables, se separó a las familias, se cerraron las fronteras, varias embarcaciones fueron rechazadas y se siguieron registrando pérdidas de vidas en el mar.

4. En muchas regiones, el discurso divisivo y politizado sobre los refugiados y los migrantes contribuyó a aumentar los riesgos en materia de protección. No obstante, y a pesar de los importantes retos sociales y económicos a los que se enfrentaban los principales países de acogida, los gobiernos y las comunidades siguieron dando muestras de solidaridad y generosidad, defendiendo los principios de la protección internacional de los refugiados. Alrededor del 84 % de los refugiados fueron acogidos por países de regiones en desarrollo.

5. Durante 2018, regresaron a sus zonas o países de origen alrededor de 2,9 millones de personas, de los cuales unos 2,3 millones eran desplazados internos y 594.000 eran refugiados. Si bien, según las estimaciones, 1,4 millones de refugiados necesitaban ser reasentados, solo había disponibles unas 81.300 plazas.

By Mark Richard South, IFRC

With the aim of promoting mutual understanding, social inclusion, and ultimately successful integration, the two Red Cross Societies are working through the AVAIL project to match up new arrivals with local “buddies”.

“In the wake of the refugee crisis there was a spontaneous upsurge of public support towards refugees in Ireland,” said Susanna Cunningham, manager of the AVAIL project with the Irish Red Cross.

“Buddying is a great way to harness that goodwill and help local communities get to know and welcome refugees and asylum seekers better as individuals.”

The buddies are volunteers drawn from the local community able to provide practical and emotional support, as well as opening doors to local networks, to help people ease their way into the new culture, society and community

Matching partners based on location, gender, age and shared interests, ensures refugees and asylum seekers and their buddies have common ground from which to build, and means people have at least one person they know as they settle into their new community.

“In Latvia, there are not really established communities of refugees or asylum seekers, so buddies play a really important role helping people to settle,” said Agnese Trofimova, AVAIL manager for the Latvian Red Cross.

“The culture, society, and language here are so different from what people might be used to, buddies are a vital link to the new communities people find themselves in.”

As well as being hugely useful in helping with basic practical issues and local knowledge – things like how to open a bank account, where to access adult education, what are the best local transport routes – buddies also provide an opportunity for people to practice their language skills, as well as offering friendship.

By spending time with buddies, refugees and asylum seekers themselves get to understand more about local culture and society, but also give buddies and the local community a chance to gain a greater understanding of refugees and asylum seekers as people: the cultures they have come from, the journeys they have made, the challenges they have overcome, and how they can contribute to the community and wider society in their new country.

By Phillip Connor and Jeffrey S. Passel

Europe has experienced a high level of immigration in recent years, driving debate about how countries should deal with immigrants when it comes to social services, security issues, deportation policies and integration efforts. Among these recently arrived immigrants are many who live in Europe without authorization. Coupled with unauthorized immigrants who were already in Europe, their numbers reach into the millions, though together they make up a small share of Europe’s total population.

A new Pew Research Center analysis based on European data sources estimates that at least 3.9 million unauthorized immigrants – and possibly as many as 4.8 million – lived in Europe in 2017. The total is up from 2014, when 3.0 million to 3.7 million unauthorized migrants lived in Europe, but is little changed from a recent peak of 4.1 million to 5.3 million in 2016.

Overall, unauthorized immigrants accounted for less than 1% of Europe’s total population of more than 500 million people living in the 28 European Union member states, including the United Kingdom, and four European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland). And among the roughly 24 million noncitizens of EU-EFTA countries living in Europe, fewer than one-fifth were unauthorized immigrants in 2017.

The recent rise in Europe’s long-standing unauthorized immigrant population from nations outside of EU-EFTA countries is largely due to a surge of asylum seekers who mostly arrived in 2015, when more than 1.3 million people applied for asylum in EU-EFTA countries. Many from that wave have been approved to remain in Europe. Many others, however, have had their applications rejected. Some have appealed those denials. Still others whose applications were rejected or withdrawn continue to live in Europe.

Meanwhile, many asylum seekers in Europe are still awaiting a decision on their pending application, a group that is part of our estimates, and accounted for nearly a quarter (20% to 24%) of Europe’s unauthorized immigrant population in 2017. Although asylum seekers waiting for a decision have a temporary legal standing, their future in Europe is uncertain. Most entered their country of residence without permission, and the majority of applicants are now seeing their applications rejected. Consequently, many have been or could be subject to deportation orders in the future.

Since asylum seekers waiting for a decision have a temporary lawful status, the Center also produced estimates of the unauthorized immigrant population without this group. These estimates are lower – 2.9 million to 3.8 million in 2017 – yet still show an apparent increase from 2014 before the asylum seeker surge, when the unauthorized immigrant population without asylum seekers waiting for a decision was an estimated 2.4 million to 3.2 million. (For estimates of the unauthorized immigrant population in Europe and by country without waiting asylum seekers, see Appendix C.)

Unauthorized immigrants made up roughly one-fifth (16% to 20%) of Europe’s total non-EUEFTA population in 2017, according to estimates, with 4% being unauthorized immigrants with a pending asylum claim that year. This means authorized non-EU-EFTA citizens living in Europe outnumbered unauthorized immigrants by about four to one.

The Center’s new estimates come at a time when publics across Europe express mixed opinions on the place of immigrants in their societies. A 2018 multi-nation survey from the Center found that majorities in several European countries support the deportation of immigrants living in their countries illegally. On the other hand, when asked about refugees fleeing war and violence, the 2018 survey also found that majorities across Europe support taking them in, a group that has often entered Europe without permission and claims asylum.

This is the first time Pew Research Center has estimated the size of Europe’s unauthorized migrant population. The methodology used for these new estimates builds on the Center’s more than 15 years of experience in estimating the size of the unauthorized immigrant population in the United States. The unauthorized immigrant population in the U.S. is more than double the size (10.3 million to 10.7 million in 2017) of that in Europe (3.9 million to 4.8 million); has been decreasing in number since 2007; and makes up a larger share of the total population (roughly 3% in the U.S. compared with less than 1% in Europe). (See our related blog post for more details on how unauthorized immigrant populations and their characteristics differ between Europe and the U.S.)

The Center’s estimates are also the first comprehensive estimate for Europe in a decade. Europe’s unauthorized migrant population was last estimated for 2008 by an EU-funded team of European researchers called the Clandestino project. At that time, the number living in the EU was estimated to be 1.9 million to 3.8 million, not including asylum seekers with pending decisions. By comparison, our estimate for 2017 for EU countries only, excluding asylum seekers with a pending application, is 2.8 million to 3.7 million – the upper end of Clandestino’s 2008 estimate.

Ending AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria

Smart, effective health investments through the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria have saved more than 20 million lives since 2002, expanding opportunity and achieving greater social justice for families and communities worldwide.

Our Partnership

As a founding partner, Ireland has been a key supporter of the Global Fund since 2002, contributing €193.5 million between 2002 and 2016. For the three-year funding period starting in 2017, Ireland has pledged €30 million – a firm sign of its commitment to alleviate the burden of the three diseases and building strong and resilient health systems. This represents the largest single investment for Ireland in global health and HIV.

Ireland takes part in the central governance of the Global Fund as part of the Point Seven voting constituency on the Global Fund Board (comprising countries that are committed to reaching the target of 0.7 percent of gross national income for official development assistance). In addition, Ireland participates in Country Coordination Mechanisms – the committee of community, government and health representatives that develop and guide Global Fund-supported programs in a country – in Uganda and Mozambique. Ireland’s priorities have contributed to important Global Fund decisions, with increased emphasis on resilient and sustainable systems for health, greater focus on challenging operating environments and sustained commitment to transparency and accountability.

Priority Areas of the Partnership

Resilient and Sustainable Systems for Health: The universal right to health is the principle that aligns the Global Fund with Irish Aid’s priority of ensuring equity of access to quality health care. The Global Fund’s core mission – to end HIV, TB and malaria as epidemics – can only be achieved with stronger systems for health, including improved facilities, care, training for health workers, information management, access, and stronger community support and response mechanisms. Global Fund investments in the treatment and prevention of HIV, TB, and malaria do not just improve the response to those diseases – they improve countries’ overall health systems. Forty percent of Global Fund investments go toward building resilient and sustainable systems for health.

The Euro-Med Monitor expresses its serious concern over the alarming conditions of Irish refugee centres, which according to experts akin to prison-like conditions.

Asylum seekers in Ireland are placed in Direct Provision (DP) centres until their status has been assessed, which on average takes about 14 months, and some have been held for up to four years. This system was introduced 20 years ago, and conditions are appalling. Even after being granted permission to stay in Ireland, some have to stay in direct provision centres because they are unable to find housing.

Most of the DP centres are owned and run by private businesses. Asylum seekers receive an allowance of €19.10 per week per adult and €9.60 per child, which is beneath the bare minimum to cover their needs. Residents are not allowed to cook for themselves and are given low-quality and culturally inappropriate food. Asylum seekers have no access to work or education.

Families and large groups of people are cramped into small bedrooms. Some rooms don’t have a door, there is no insulation and the furniture are worn and unclean. There is no privacy in these centres and there are many restrictions regarding food, decorations residents may make to their rooms, and visitors, and the centres implement a curfew.

Reports have indicated that 90 percent of DP residents suffer from depression after the first six months of their stay. Between 2007 and 2017, forty-four people died in the centres. The cause of death for fifteen of said victims was recorded as “unknown” or simply “died.” However, there were no further inquiries into any of these cases.

Furthermore, the Euro-Med Monitor is particularly worried about children who live in these centres, where nappies and formula milk are often denied to new-born babies. Two government reports by Ireland's Public Service Oversight Committee and the Health Information and Quality Authority, concluded that DP was “not fit for purpose” and “placed children at risk.”

Although, Irish Prime Minister Leo Varadkar has admittedly said that DP centres for asylum seekers "are imperfect," yet he claims the conditions there "are not inhumane." The Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor disagrees strongly with this statement.

The Euro-Med Monitor is concerned that Ireland is not doing enough efforts to improve the appalling conditions of its Direct Provision centres in order to deter asylum seekers from seeking refuge in the country. The United Nations has described the system as a “severe violation of human rights.”

The Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor calls for more transparency and accountability regarding the management of the Direct Provision system and demands immediate improvement of asylum seekers’ living conditions.

EU Aid: Total shift required to Leave No One Behind – Aidwatch Report 2019

Brussels, 21 November 2019 – EU aid decreased in 2018, continuing the downward trend from 2017. Despite the well-received 25% reduction in inflated aid, EU aid is still decreasing after discounting these components. This means that, at the current rate of growth, the EU will only meet the 0.7% ODA/GNI target in 2061, as revealed by the CONCORD AidWatch Report 2019.

Looking into the Leave No One Behind principle and how to actually implement it, the AidWatch report shows that the current EU ODA allocation is not guided by the high levels of poverty and inequality in some regions of the world.

n 2018, EU aid level decreased by 5.8% in absolute terms compared to the previous year. While inflated aid still represents 14% of the total EU aid budget, this decline, mainly among a dozen EU Member States, is correlated to the decrease of several components, like in-donor refugee costs, tied aid and debt relief, all reported as ODA.

We are moving further away from the 2030 Agenda. Not only are we missing the target in terms of quantity, but also the quality of aid is lagging behind. Fewer resources from the EU are dedicated to poverty eradication and global sustainable development. As a consequence of EU interests overtaking development objectives for several years, a change in aid recipient countries must be noted, which badly affects countries and people left behind.
Luca De Fraia
Expert from ActionAid Italy

Although a slight increase of EU aid went from the Member States to the Least Developed Countries (from 0.11% in 2017 to 0.12% in 2018), the AidWatch 2019 report points out that those most in need of resources currently receive only 8% of EU aid and that only 2 countries, from the top 10 EU aid recipients, have been identified as such by our methodology [1].

All world leaders have pledged to leave no one behind on the journey to sustainable development. EU leaders have a big responsibility to make sure that they provide more international aid, but also that aid is used effectively for the people being left behind in the world today. Better data, better analysis and a comprehensive approach to funding is needed, so that aid does what will make the biggest difference to people who are most marginalised, excluded or discriminated against and the poorest and most financially challenged countries.
Åsa Thomasson
Expert from CONCORD Sweden

The CONCORD AidWatch report 2019 assembles a whole set of recommendations on how to start implementing the Leave No One Behind principle and ensure that EU aid is adequately used for poverty and inequality reduction.

by Susan Fratzke and Emma Dorst

WASHINGTON — Rapid arrivals of humanitarian migrants in Europe and North America have been matched by an equally unprecedented outpouring of public support. As offers to volunteer and donate pour in, many have asked whether this generosity can be harnessed to ease pressures on overburdened receiving communities and service providers. But using volunteers to meet the longer-term integration needs of resettled refugees and recognized asylum seekers is not an automatic salve: it requires thoughtful training and investment to be effective.

A new report for the Migration Policy Institute’s Transatlantic Council on Migration, Volunteers and Sponsors: A Catalyst for Refugee Integration?, considers how the benefits of volunteering can be harnessed by overstretched providers. It assesses where community members can add the most value to integration efforts and distils the challenges that community organizations and integration service providers face in engaging volunteers. It concludes by offering recommendations for how policymakers can facilitate the effective engagement of communities in integration.

While volunteer efforts cannot replace specialized social service agencies or well-resourced social assistance programs, they do offer unique resources that can be an invaluable complement to the services that professional agencies and case workers are able to provide, authors Susan Fratzke and Emma Dorst write. Yet engaging volunteers or community sponsors is hardly a cost-free or even cost-saving endeavour for most resettlement and integration agencies. To succeed, volunteers and sponsors require vetting, training, supervision and ongoing support.

The report offers a few ways in which policymakers can help fill gaps, including by creating policy frameworks that allow agencies to engage volunteers or sponsors where they would add the most value; and provide dedicated resources to establish and maintain effective community engagement.

“Investing in the ability of integration service providers to identify, train, manage and support volunteers and sponsors can enable a community to leverage its human and financial resources to achieve positive integration outcomes that benefit governments, communities and newcomers alike,” the researchers conclude.

The report is the second in a new Transatlantic Council series, “Rebuilding Community After Crisis: An Updated Social Contract for a New Migration Reality.” Drawing from papers presented at the Council’s twentieth plenary meeting, held in Vienna, the series examines how the fundamental tenets of integration and building strong communities have changed in response to the pressures of mixed migration flows.

A high-level Irish delegation led by the Irish Tánaiste (Deputy Prime Minister) and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Mr. Simon Coveney, visited the Gaza Strip today and met Palestine refugee students from the UNRWA school in Jabalia refugee camp. Their visit enabled them to see first-hand the impact of Ireland’s commitment to supporting quality basic education for children, including the 282,000 UNRWA students in Gaza.

In meetings with UNRWA management, the delegation discussed the humanitarian situation in the besieged Strip and the operational challenges facing the Agency. UNRWA serves both the emergency and development needs of some 1.4 million Palestine refugees residing in the coastal enclave, the large majority of whom are dependent on services and assistance from UNRWA, given the dire socio-economic situation in Gaza - a result of thirteen years of blockade, repeated rounds of hostilities and ongoing political deadlock.

Following the meeting with students, Minister Coveney said: “Ireland is a long-standing supporter of UNRWA in its provision of services to Palestinian refugees. I have seen at first hand today just how vital the provision of education and health care is in maintaining the hope, rights and dignity of refugees here in Gaza.”

“I was pleased to inform UNRWA that Ireland will provide an additional EUR 2.5 million in funding to this year to support the delivery of these core services. This brings Ireland’s support to UNRWA in 2019 to EUR 7.5 million.”

Mr. Trond Jensen, Senior Deputy Director of UNRWA Operations in Gaza, said: “Ireland sets a great example in terms of their support for Palestine refugees and has stood very firmly with the Agency during very challenging times. A visit like today sends a strong message of hope to the people of Gaza, especially to our young students, showing them that their futures matter and their voices are heard. We are tremendously grateful for our partnership with the people and Government of Ireland and their important political and financial support provided to UNRWA and Palestine refugees, including in Gaza.”

FOR MORE INFORMATION, PLEASE CONTACT:

Sami Mshasha
Director of Communications, Arabic Language Spokesperson
Mobile: +972 (0)54 216 8295
Office: +972 (0)258 90724
Email: s.mshasha@unrwa.org

Tamara Alrifai
UNRWA Spokesperson
Mobile: +962 (0)79 090 0140
Email: T.ALRIFAI@UNRWA.ORG

Overview

In the first nine months of 2019, just over 27,200 refugees were submitted by UNHCR for resettlement to 20 countries in Europe. This is 84% of the total submissions in 2018, and already more than double the average rate of 17,800 submissions per year during the previous 10 years. Three countries that received smaller numbers of resettlement submissions in 2018 have not yet received submissions during 2019.

Europe’s proportion of resettlement submissions globally in 2019 is 42%. Between 2009 and 2016, this proportion increased from 10% to 18%, before substantially increasing to 52% during 2017 and 40% during 2018. The increase in 2017 is primarily due to a significant decrease globally in the scale of some States’ resettlement programmes, most notably by the United States of America, in parallel to an increase of resettlement places made available by European States.

Minister of State for the Diaspora and International Development Ciarán Cannon, T.D., today announced an additional €1 million for cyclone recovery efforts in Mozambique in 2019.

Minister Cannon said:

“The Government and people of Mozambique are still coping with the devastating impact of cyclones Idai and Kenneth earlier this year. Homes, schools and medical facilities need to be rebuilt. In my discussions today, I reaffirmed Ireland’s continued support for Mozambique, including an additional €1 million to assist their efforts to recover from these terrible cyclones.”

Minister Cannon made the announcement during his meeting today with the Mozambican Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, José Pacheco.

Additional funding from Ireland will provide shelter, healthcare, and livelihoods support to communities still struggling to cope with the impacts of cyclones Idai and Kenneth, which devastated parts of Mozambique in early 2019 – Idai was the worst cyclone ever in the southern hemisphere. Ireland’s support will further assist the Mozambican government’s preparedness and risk reduction efforts in advance of the approaching cyclone season.

During their meeting, Minister Cannon and Minister Pacheco discussed progress under the Memorandum of Understanding between Ireland and Mozambique, which they signed in September, and which underpins the strong bilateral engagement between Ireland and Mozambique at political level and in terms of trade and investment and Ireland’s international development programme in Mozambique. This included an update on Ireland’s Strategy for Africa to 2025, published last week as part of the Global Ireland programme.

Minister of State Cannon’s visit to Mozambique is ongoing from 5 to 9 November, 2019. Following a full schedule of political and Irish community engagements in Maputo on 6 November, Minister of State Cannon will travel north to the province of Inhambane on 7 and 8 November, where he will visit a number of Irish Aid-funded health, education and water and sanitation projects. In March and April 2019, Cyclones Idai and Kenneth wreaked havoc in Mozambique, leaving more than 2 million people in urgent humanitarian need. In immediate response, Ireland allocated just over €3 million to NGO and UN partners, to assist them with meeting emergency shelter, healthcare, education and food needs.

Mozambique is one of the top recipients of Ireland’s bilateral official development assistance (ODA) annually, totalling €20.584 million in 2018.

Ireland’s ODA to Mozambique is managed by the Embassy of Ireland in Mozambique. It aims to increase access for the most vulnerable to health, education and social protection services as well as diversified and climate smart rural livelihoods, and to support effective and transparent government institutions engaging with a stronger civil society. It also provides support for the ongoing peace and reconciliation process in Mozambique.

Ireland’s support to cyclone recovery efforts in 2019 is channelled via NGO, UN, and government partners, including the Concern, Plan International, International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), and the National Disaster Management Institute of Mozambique.

Global Ireland: Ireland’s Strategy for Africa to 2025 was launched on 29 November 2019. The text is available here: https://www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/publications/Global-Ireland---Irelands-Strategy-for-Africa-to-2025.pdf

Question

What are the lessons learned on the role of conditionality specifically in securing provisions protecting women’s rights as an outcome of a peace process? What other approaches can be used by international development partners to ensure inclusion of women’s rights provisions?
What lessons can be applied to the Afghanistan peace process?

Contents

1. Summary

2. Context

3. Approaches to promote women’s rights in peace processes

4. Women and the Afghanistan peace process

5. References

1. Summary

This rapid literature review found no examples of the use of aid conditionality specifically to ensure inclusion of women’s rights provisions in peace process outcomes, but did identify other effective approaches, notably mobilisation of women, external pressure by mediators/international development partners, and funding and capacity building support for women’s groups. There are examples of peace processes where these various mechanisms have been used, and international development partners can play important roles in promoting these. In the context of the Afghanistan peace process with the Taliban, it is vital that women have a ‘place at the table’ and that their rights be safeguarded.

This review draws on a mixture of academic and grey literature. It found far greater focus in the literature on participation of women in peace processes, than on the inclusion of women’s rights in peace process outcomes.
Aid conditionality refers to attempts by donor governments to induce recipient governments to change their policies and behaviour, as well as to influence the way aid itself is spent. Peace conditionality is used as a lever to persuade conflicting parties to make peace, to implement a proposed peace accord, and to consolidate peace. Peace conditionality can potentially be used to ensure a gender perspective in peace agreements. The latter includes three layered components (Bell, 2015: 17):

a. the inclusion of women in peace process negotiations, and support to women to participate effectively;

b. the inclusion of provisions designed to address the particular needs of women;

c. an assessment of the implications for women and men of any provision in the peace agreement, including provision for legislation, policies or programmes in any area and at all levels, with a view to ensuring that men and women benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated.

In the past few decades, there has been greater recognition in the international community of the essential role women can play in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction, notably since passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (SCR 1325), approved in October 2000. Women’s involvement in peace processes brings significant benefits, including a long-term perspective on peace and stability (as opposed to just an absence of formal conflict) and durability of peace agreements. Women’s participation is also important to ensure women’s rights are addressed. The inclusion of gender provisions in peace agreements and newly established constitutions is critical to the emergence of equitable and more inclusive societies in the post-conflict phase.

Additional persons repatriated through UCPM activation 200 Of whom 95 EU citizens (1 flight by UK)